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DECISION AND SEARCH IN NON-ABELIAN CRAMER SHOUP
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
DELARAM KAHROBAEI AND MICHAEL ANSHEL
Abstract. A method for non-abelian Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem is presented. The
role of decision and search is explored, and the platform of solvable/polycyclic group is
suggested. In the process we review recent progress in non-abelian cryptography and
post some open problems that naturally arise from this path of research.
1. Introduction
The field of combinatorial group theory began with decision problems of Max Dehn from
1912, known as the word problem, the conjugacy problem and the isomorphism problem.
These fields have developed close connections to topology, logic and computer science.
Word problem: Let G be a group given by a finite presentation. Does there exist an
algorithm to determine if an arbitrary word w in the generators of G whether or not w =G
1? Conjugacy problem: Let G be a group given by a finite presentation. Does there exist an
algorithm to determine if an arbitrary pair of words u and v in the generators of G whether
or not u and v define conjugate elements of G? By the celebrated theorem of Novikov
[25] and Boone [7], there are groups for which these questions are undecidable: they
cannot be answered algorithmically. Nevertheless, because of the practical importance of
these problems, a lot of effort is devoted to the development of methods for investigating
finitely presented groups. The study of designing such algorithms and implementing them,
is computational group theory. These topics have generated much attention and proved of
importance in modern cryptography, namely algebraic cryptography, initiated in 1999 by
I.Anshel, M.Anshel and D.Goldfeld [1]. Algebraic key establishment protocols based on the
difficulty of solving equations over algebraic structures are described as a theoretical basis
for constructing public-key cryptosystems. These applications rely strongly on complexity
of decision problems in combinatorial group theory. Needless to say, complexity problems
are some of the most important problems in mathematics.
1.1. Motivation. Key exchange problems are of central interest in cryptology [24]. The
basic aim of key exchange problems is that two people who can only communicate via an
insecure channel want to find a common secret key. Key exchange methods are usually
based on one-way functions; that is, functions which are easy to compute, while their
inverses are difficult to determine (see [26, 15]). Here ’easy’ and ’difficult’ can mean that
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the complexities or the practicality of the methods are far away from each other; ideally,
the one-way function has a polynomial complexity and its inverse has an exponential com-
plexity. Many of the known one-way functions have a common problem: it is often easy to
find a one-way function with a polynomial complexity, but showing that there is no inverse
function with similar complexity or practicality is usually the difficult part of the project,
since the best inverse function might just not have been discovered yet. Hence it is of in-
terest to investigate new one-way functions. The decision problems in combinatorial group
theory have shown much potential for this purpose. Another reason is that, using Shors
algorithm the discrete log problem and prime factorization problem admit polynomial-
time quantum algorithm. That leaves the current cryptosystem in danger if the quantum
computers are to be built! Non-abelian (a.k.a Non-commutative) group theorists have
been working in the field of non-commutative cryptography for about ten years, but a
class of groups which provides a provably secure basis for the non-commutative protocols
is not known yet. The groups of the authors interest are mainly polycyclic groups. These
are natural generalizations of cyclic groups but are much more complex in their structure.
Hence their algorithmic theory is more difficult.
In the last decade the Braid group cryptography has been of great interest to many
researchers in the field and has been investigated by private and public sectors. No such
investigation has been done for solvable/polycyclic groups.
The reason for developing a non-abelian Cramer-Shoup is to strengthen the non-commutative
ElGamal [20]. We think that it should be secured against CCA1 and CCA2. The
tested modification would be tested while such research can go on for developing the
non-commutative ElGamal [20]. It has been pointed oout to us that the goal of Cramer-
Shoup was to defend ElGamal against chosen ciphertext attacks. We do not know if the
non-commutative ElGamal [20] can be attacked using chosen ciphertext attack. However
in the meantime a C-S like cryptosystem can be developed to defend the KK06.
2. Applications of Non-commutative Group Theory in Cryptography
In 1984, Wagner et al. [32] proposed an approach to design of public-key cryptosystems
based on groups and semigroups with undecidable word problem. In 2005, Birget et al. [6]
pointed out that Wagner’s idea is actually not based on word problem, but on, generally
easier, premise problem. And finally, Birget et al. proposed a new public-key cryptosystem
which is based on finitely presented groups with hard word problem. In 1999, Anshel et
al. [1] proposed a compact algebraic key establishment protocol. The foundation of their
method lies in the difficulty of solving equations over algebraic structures, in particular
non-commutative groups. In their pioneering paper, they also suggested that braid groups
may be good alternative platforms for PKC(public-key cryptography). Subsequently, Ko
et al. [22] and Dehornoy [9] developed the theory and practice of braid-based cryptography.
The security foundation is that the conjugator search problem (CSP) is intractable when
the system parameters, such as braid index and the canonical length of the working braids,
are selected properly. In 2002, certain homomorphic cryptosystems were constructed for
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the first time for non-abelian groups due to Grigoriev and Ponomarenko [17]. Shortly
afterwards, they [18] extended their method to arbitrary nonidentity finite groups based
on the difficulty of the membership problem for groups of integer matrices. In 2004, Eick
and Kahrobaei [12] proposed a new cryptosystem based on polycyclic groups. In 2005
Baumslag, Fine and Xu proposed public key cryptosystem using the modular group [3],
[4]. In 2005, Shpilrain and Ushakov [28] suggested that R. Thompson’s group may be a
good platform for constructing public-key cryptosystems. In their contribution, the key
assumption is the intractability of the decomposition problem, which is more general than
the conjugator search problem, defined over R. Thompson’s group, also a infinite non-
abelian group given by finite presentation. In [8], Cao et al. propose a new method for
designing public key cryptosystems based on general non-commutative rings. The key idea
of their proposal is that for a given non-commutative ring, they can define polynomials
and take them as the underlying work structure. In 2006 Kahrobaei and Khan, proposed
a non-commutative key-exchange scheme which generalizes the classical ElGamal Cipher
[20]. This scheme is closer to the spirit of ElGamal and the they proposed polycyclic
groups for such protocol.
Recently, Gilman, et al in [14] study the algorithmic security of the Anshel-Anshel-
Goldfeld (AAG) key exchange scheme and show that contrary to prevalent opinion, the
computational hardness of AAG depends on the structure of the chosen subgroups, rather
than on the conjugacy problem of the ambient braid group. Proper choice of these sub-
groups produces a key exchange scheme which is resistant to all known attacks on AAG.
In recent work [16], Grigoriev et al, show new constructions of cryptosystems based
on group invariants and suggest methods to make such cryptosystems secure in practice.
In their paper their introduce a new notion of cryptographic security, a provable break,
and prove that cryptosystems based on matrix group invariants and also a variation of
the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol for modular groups are secure against
provable worst-case break unless NP ⊂ RP .
2.1. Non-Commutative Key Exchange using Conjugacy. The following is the key
exchange problem proposed by Kahrobaei and Khan [20].
Let G be a finitely presented non-abelian group having solvable word problem. Let S, T <
G be finitely generated proper subgroups of G, for which the subgroup [S, T ] (i.e. the
subgroup generated by {[s, t] | s ∈ S, t ∈ T}) is the trivial subgroup consisting of just the
identity element of G. Now suppose two parties, Alice and Bob, wish to establish a session
key over an unsecured network.
Bob takes s ∈ S, b ∈ G and publishes b and c = bs as his public keys, keeping s as his
private key. If Alice wishes to send x ∈ G as a session key to Bob, she first chooses a
random t ∈ T and sends
E = x(c
t)
to Bob, along with the header
h = bt.
Bob then calculates (bt)s = (bs)t = ct with the header. He can now compute
E′ = (ct)−1
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which allows him to decrypt the session key,
(x(c
t))E
′
= (x(c
t))(c
t)−1 = x.
The element x ∈ G can now be used as a session key.
The feasibility of this scheme rests on the assumption that products and inverses of
elements of G can be computed efficiently. To deduce Bob’s private key from public
information would require solving the equation c = bs for s, given the public values b and
c. This is called the conjugacy search problem for G. Thus the security of this scheme
rests on the assumption that there is no fast algorithm for solving the conjugacy search
problem for the group G.
2.2. Non-Commutative Key Exchange using Power Conjugacy. The following is
the key-exchange problem which was proposed by Kahrobaei and Khan in [20] What if the
conjugacy search problem is tractable? The next paradigm embellishes conjugacy-based
key exchange to address this possibility. Bob takes s ∈ S, g ∈ G and n ∈ N and publishes
v = gn and w = s−1gs as his public keys. Note that the centralizer of g is trivial. Bob
keeps n ∈ N and s ∈ S as his private keys. Note that v and w satisfy wn = s−1vs. If Alice
wishes to send x ∈ G to Bob, she first chooses a random m ∈ N and t ∈ T . To encrypt x,
Alice computes
E = x−1t−1(v)mtx = x−1t−1gmntx
and sends it to Bob along with the header
h = t−1wmt = t−1s−1gmst.
Bob receives E and h, and computes
E′ = shns−1 = t−1gmnt.
Note that E = x−1E′x, so if Bob can solve the conjugacy search problem, he can obtain
x ∈ G, which can then serve as the common secret that can be used as a symmetric session
key for secure communication.
The feasibility of this scheme rests on the assumption that products and inverses of
elements of G can be computed efficiently, and that the conjugacy problem is solvable.
To deduce Bob’s private key from public information would require solving the equation
wn = s−1gns for n and s, given the public values gn and w. This is called the power
conjugacy search problem for G. Thus the security of this scheme rests on the assumption
that there is no fast algorithm for solving the power conjugacy search problem for the
group G.
3. Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem
Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem is a generalization of ElGamal Key exchange problems,
it is provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Moreover, the proof of
security relies only on a standard intractability assumption, namely, the hardness of the
Diffie-Hellman decision problem in underlying group (see [31], [30]). A hash function H
whose output can be interpreted as a number in Zq (where q is a large prime number). It
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should be hard to find collisions in H. In fact, with a fairly minor increase in cost and
complexity, one can eliminate H altogether.
3.1. Definition of provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
The right formal, mathematical definition of security against active attacks evolved in a
sequence of papers by Naor and Yung, Rackoff and Simon, Dolev, Dwork and Naor. The
notion is called chosen ciphertext security or equivalently non-malleability. The intuitive
thrust of this definition is that even if an adversary can get arbitrary ciphertexts of his
choice decrypted, he still gets no partial information about other encrypted messages. (see
for more information see [31], [30])
3.2. The Cramer-Shoup Scheme. Secret Key: random x1, x2, y1, y2, z ∈ Zq
Public Key:
g1, g2 in G (but not 1)
c = g1
x1g2
x2 , d = g1
y1g2
y2
h = g1
z.
Encryption of m ∈ G: (u1, u2, e, v), where
u1 = g1
r, u2 = g2
r, e = hrm, v = crdrα, r in Zq is random, and
α = H(u1, u2, e).
Decryption of (u1, u2, e, v):
If v = u1
x1+αy1u2
x2+αy2 , where α = H(u1, u2, e)
then m = e/u1
z
else ”reject”
4. Non-commutative Cramer-Shoup Key-exchange problem
The objective of this section is to propose non-commutative Cramer-Shoup cryptosys-
tem and analyze its security. As it is pointed out in [31], [30], with a fairly minor increase
in cost and complexity, one can eliminate the hash function altogether and that is what
we are doing in this scheme. However the following problem still remains open: Can our
protocol be extended that our C-S like cryptosystem can be modified which needs a Hash
function?
Let G be a non-abelian group such that every element has a normal form, and the
conjugacy search problem is hard.
Secret Key: random x1, x2, y1, y2, z ∈ G
Public Key:
g1, g2 in G (but not 1), such that [g2
x2 , g1
y1 ] = 1
c = g1
x1g2
x2 , where g1
x1 = x1
−1g1x1 and g2
x2 = x2
−1g2x2
d = g1
y1g2
y2 , where g1
y1 = y1
−1g1y1 and g2
y2 = y2
−1g2y2
h = g1
z = z−1g1z.
Encryption of m ∈ G: (u1, u2, e, v), where
u1 = g1
r = r−1g1r, u2 = g2
r = r−1g2r, e = m
hr , v = crdr.
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Suppose r be a random element in G such it commutes with x1, x2, y1, y2 and z.
Decryption of (u1, u2, e, v):
If v = u1
x1u1
y1u2
x2u2
y2
(g1
x1g2
x2)r(g1
y1g2
y2)r = g1
rx1g1
ry1g2
rx2g2
ry2
g1
x1rg2
x2rg1
y1rg2
y2r = g1
x1rg2
x2rg1
y1rg2
y2r
then m = e(u1
z)−1 = mh
ru1
z
−1
= mu1
z(u1z)
−1
else ”reject”
Note that the authors currently experimenting the search for the secure randomly gener-
ated r.
5. Polycyclic groups new platform for cryptology
Polycyclic groups are a natural generalization of cyclic groups, but they are much more
complex in their structure than cyclic groups. Hence their algorithmic theory is more
difficult and thus it seems promising to investigate classes of polycyclic groups as candi-
dates to have a more substantial platform perhaps more secure. Recall that a group is
called polycyclic if there exists a polycyclic series through the group; that is, a subnormal
series of finite length with cyclic factors. There are two different natural representations
for these groups which can be used for computations: polycyclic presentations and matrix
groups over the integers. We refer to [29], [27], [13], [11], [5] and [19] for background and
a more detailed introduction to polycyclic groups.
In particular polycyclic groups are linear. In this setting, both group multiplication and
the word problem are efficiently solvable, since matrix multiplication for such groups is
solvable in polynomial time. One can show that for a subgroup of a general linear group,
if two elements are conjugate then they have the same Jordan normal form. Using this
lemma one conclude that the search conjugacy problem in any subgroup of the General
Linear group is solvable. However the complexity is not known but is conjectured to be
exponential. Kharlampovich [21] showed that there is a finitely presented solvable group
with an undecidable word problem. It follows by a theorem of Arzhantseva-Osin in [2] that
the word problem is in NP for any finitely generated metabelian group. For polycyclic
groups, some decision problems are known to be difficult but not provably so [10, 23].
A large growth rate would imply a large key space for the set of all possible keys, thus
making the brute force search of this space intractable. Ideally, we would like to use
groups which exhibit provably exponential growth. A large class of polycyclic groups
are known to have an exponential growth rate, namely those which are not virtually
nilpotent, by results of Wolf and Milnor in 1968. Using these observations about the
polycyclic groups, we conjecture they are the best candidate for the non-abelian Cramer-
Shoup cryptosystem.
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